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Climate Change and Dam Owner Liability in
Rhode Island
October 2019
This guide is a product of the Marine Affairs Institute at Roger Williams University School of Law and the Rhode Island Sea Grant Legal
Program. The authors of this report are Read Porter, Senior Staff Attorney, James Philopena, Jr., Rhode Island Sea Grant Law Fellow, and
Cory Lee, Rhode Island Sea Grant Law Fellow. All errors and omissions are the responsibility of the Marine Affairs Institute. This study is
provided only for informational and educational purposes and is not legal advice.

Increasing precipitation associated with climate change is affecting dam operation and hazards in
Rhode Island. Flooding caused by increased precipitation or extreme weather events can cause dam
failure or upstream or downstream flooding, resulting in loss of life and property. These losses can
result in liability, which may vary based on the dam owner and its purpose. This study assists dam
owners and the public in understanding the potential liabilities that may arise as a result of flooding
from extreme weather events. Section one provides a background of dam hazards in Rhode Island
in the context of climate change. Section two introduces the statutory, common law, and
constitutional claims that may be brought against a dam owner after a flood. Section three applies
these potential liabilities to illustrate how they may apply to different types of dams and dam owners.
Section four evaluates Rhode Island law in the context of state laws from the northeast region,
focusing on the application of statutory liability, strict liability and negligence standards, and liability
for drawdown. Finally, the study concludes in section 5.

Background
Changing precipitation patterns are affecting the safety and operation of dams in Rhode Island.
Average annual precipitation today is eight inches greater than 1930 levels and is projected to
continue increasing by about an inch per decade.1 Individual storms have also grown more severe
over the past fifty years.2 More precipitation and more severe storms pose challenges for dam
owners in Rhode Island.
Extreme weather events can cause dams to fail. Dams are engineered to accommodate a specific
design flood.3 Extreme weather events that exceed the design flood can cause dams to fail through

E-mail from Elizabeth Stone, R.I. Dep’t Envtl. Mgmt., to author (Apr. 17, 2019).
NARRAGANSETT BAY ESTUARY PROGRAM, STATE OF NARRAGANSETT BAY AND ITS WATERSHED: TECHNICAL
REPORT 62 (2017).
3 Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, FEMA P-94, Selecting and Accommodating Inflow Design Floods for Dams (2013);
Lesson Learned: High and Significant Hazard Dams Should be Designed to Pass an Appropriate Design Flood, ASS’N OF STATE DAM
SAFETY OFFICIALS, https://damfailures.org/lessons-learned/high-and-significant-hazard-dams-should-be-design-topass-an-appropriate-design-flood-dams-constructed-prior-to-the-availability-of-extreme-rainfall-data-should-be-assessedto-make-sure-they-have-ad/.
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overtopping or other causes, such as increased water pressure.4 According to the Association of
State Dam Safety Officials, hydrologic and flooding conditions were by far the most common cause
of dam failure between 2010 and 2017.5 When dams are not maintained adequately or are undersized
for the increasing precipitation, the risk of failure is greater. Thus, increasing precipitation and severe
precipitation may increase the risk of dam failure by exceeding predicted maximum precipitation
used in dam design or by increasing the stresses on an aging or poorly-maintained structure.
Rhode Island classifies dams according to the hazards that they pose to life and property should they
fail. The Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (RIDEM) regulates dam
operation and maintenance through the Dam Safety program within the Office of Compliance and
Inspection (OCI).6 As discussed below, OCI is required to regularly inspect dams and classify them
as high, significant, or low hazard based on the probable impacts of dam failure.7 A high hazard dam
would result in the probable loss of human life, while significant hazard dams would cause major
economic loss but not loss of life, and low hazard dams would result in no probable loss to life and
low economic loss.8 More than a quarter of Rhode Island’s dams present meaningful risk of death or
substantial property losses. Of the 668 dams in the state of Rhode Island in 2018, 96 are high-hazard
dams and 82 are significant-hazard dams.9 These impacts to life and property may result in liability
for dam owners.
Increased precipitation can cause upstream and downstream flooding even without dam failure.
Precipitation may increase the amount of water held behind a dam, causing flooding of upstream
property.10 Similarly, extreme weather events may require dam owners to release water from a dam
intentionally via primary and secondary/auxiliary spillways to relieve pressure on the dam structure,
which can inundate property downstream, including to properties not located in a flood plain.11 For
example, impoundment of water by the Addicks and Barker Dams during Tropical Storm Harvey
flooded properties above the dams, and intentional releases from those reservoirs to relieve pressure
on the dams flooded downstream properties (Figure 1).12 Both upstream and downstream flooding
can cause substantial damage to life or property even if dams work as designed.

ASS’N OF STATE DAM SAFETY OFFICIALS, LIVING WITH DAMS: EXTREME RAINFALL EVENTS CAN AND DO CAUSE
DAM FAILURES 12-15 (2015) (discussing causes of dam failure associated with extreme weather events).
5 Dam Failures and Incidents, ASS’N OF STATE DAM SAFETY OFFICIALS (2019), https://perma.cc/4GST-32ZU.
6 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 46-19-1.
7 250 R.I. CODE R. §§ 130-05-1.9, 1.11.
8 250 R.I. CODE R. § 130-05-1.5.
9 R.I. DEP’T OF ENVTL. M GMT., OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR ON
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE DAM SAFETY PROGRAM 7 (2018).
10 See In re Upstream Addicks and Barker (Texas) Flood-Control Reservoirs, 138 Fed. Cl. 658 (Fed. Cl. 2018) (detailing
flooding upstream of the Addicks and Barker dams as a consequence of Tropical Storm Harvey).
11 ASS’N OF STATE DAM S AFETY OFFICIALS, supra note 4, at 8.
12 In re Upstream Addicks and Barker (Texas) Flood-Control Reservoirs, 138 Fed. Cl. 658 (Fed. Cl. 2018); Controlled
Releases on Addicks and Barker Reservoir Increase Flooding Threat Along Buffalo Bayou, HARRIS COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DIST.
(August 29, 2017 10:45:07 PM CST), https://www.hcfcd.org/press-room/current-news/2017/08/controlled-releaseson-addicks-and-barker-reservoir-increase-flooding-threat-along-buffalo-bayou/.
4
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Figure 1. Addicks and Barker Dam flooding during Tropical Storm Harvey.13

Available Claims for Dam Flooding in Rhode Island
Damage to life and property as a result of dam failure or flooding may result in multiple sources of
legal liability to dam owners. These liabilities may differ based on dam ownership and purpose. State
and local governments, quasi-government corporations, and private individuals or corporations14 all
own dams in Rhode Island but are not subject to the same liabilities. Similarly, public drinking water
supply, storm water detention, recreation, and hydropower dams are subject to different laws.15 This
section considers the potential liabilities associated with multiple types of dams in Rhode Island.
Dam owners may be liable under three types of claims. Statutory claims are based on Rhode Island
laws and regulations, which impose strict liability upon dam owners for damage caused by
impounded waters. Common law claims based on tort theories of strict liability, negligence,
nuisance, conversion, and trespass also may apply. Last, plaintiffs can allege constitutional takings
claims against governmental or quasi-governmental dam owners where the inundation of dam water
effectuates a taking of private property.

HARRIS COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DIST., supra note 12.
Id. at 9-12.
15 Tim Faulkner, Floodgate Being Considered for Scituate Reservoir, ECORI (November 29, 2016),
https://www.ecori.org/smart-growth/2016/11/28/floodgate-considered-for-scituate-reservoir; TOWN OF BRISTOL,
NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN 40 (2016); Dam Maintenance & Safety, CITIZENS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF
WATERMAN LAKE (Apr. 22, 2019), http://www.cpwl.org/main.php?P=damsafety; Learn About Hydropower, RHODE
ISLAND OFFICE OF ENERGY RESOURCES, HTTP://WWW.ENERGY.RI.GOV/RENEWABLE-ENERGY/HYDRO/LEARNABOUT-HYDRO.PHP.
13
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2.1 Statutory and Regulatory Liability
Rhode Island statutes and regulations include language related to dam owner and precedent owner
liability for flooding. This section reviews liabilities arising from the Mill Dam Act and from
regulations issued by RIDEM
and administered by OCI. Rhode Island law provides other statutory liabilities related to dams, but
these provisions are not reviewed in detail here because they do not appear to be directly related to
dam integrity or management. For example, any violation of a public drinking water supply statute,
regulation, or permit “shall constitute a public nuisance.”16 Any new or substantial alteration of an
existing water storage facility requires approval by the Department of Health.17 However, this
approval is primarily intended to ensure the safety of water for consumption rather than to address
water levels or other operational considerations. As a result, this and similar provisions are not
addressed below, although they could affect dam owner liabilities if permit conditions affect dam
management.
2.1.1 The Mill Dam Act
The Rhode Island Mill Dam Act, also known as the Mill Act or Flowage Act, authorizes the
operation of mill dams in Rhode Island.18 The Act, first passed in 1734,19 enabled the creation of
mills by allowing dams to be created without the fear of injunction, so long as the mill owner pays
compensation for damages that result from the dam.20 The Mill Dam Act allows any person to
recover for damages caused by a mill dam from a mill dam’s owner without showing fault or
negligence. Specifically, any person may file a suit for damages when:
aggrieved or injured by the following of the pond raised by the dam, or by the
stopping or raising of the water either above or below the dam, or by the backing of
water under his or her land, or by the flowing out of any fall of water in his or her
land by means of the dam.21
The Act applies strict liability because plaintiffs do not have to prove the dam owner was negligent
or willful in the maintenance or operation of the dam.22 Instead, an injured party need only show an
injury caused by the dam’s waters.23 The Act holds both current and precedent owners liable for
damages, and it specifically references damages to both upstream and downstream properties.24
Additionally, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held in Ronci Mfg. Co. v. State that the government is

R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 46-13-15.
216 R.I. CODE R. § 50-05-1.5.
18 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 46-18-1 – 46-18-16.
19 Mowry v. Sheldon, 2 R.I. 369, 372 (R.I. 1852).
20 Slatersville Finishing Co. v. Greene, 101 A. 226, 228 (R.I. 1917).
21 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-18-2.
22 Id.
23 White v. Woonasquatucket Reservoir Co., 103 A. 795, 796 (R.I. 1918).
24 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-18-2.
16
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subject to the mandates of the Mill Dam Act.25 Therefore, liability under the Act does not vary
between, government, quasi-government and private dam owners.
While it appears to provide broad liability, the applicability of the Act is likely limited. As written and
interpreted, it refers only to mill dams – those raised “for the purpose of forming a pond to supply
water to any mill or mills upon the stream whereon the dam is located.”26 In 1852, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that it applies solely to dams raised with the intention of powering a mill and
that dams raised for other purposes, such as irrigation, are not subject to the Act’s protections or,
presumably, its liability provisions.27 Further, dams that once powered a mill but have been
abandoned for that purpose may no longer be protected by or subject to the Act.28 As a result, the
Act likely will not apply to dams erected for purposes other than hydropower or to historic mill
dams that are now used for non-mill purposes (e.g., storm water detention or recreation). Second,
the Act may not be applicable to flooding caused by dam failure or severe storms. As discussed in
section 4.1, courts in other states have limited liability under similar laws to compensation at the
initial raising of the dam. In these states, plaintiffs must resolve damages claims from failure or
storm flooding solely through common law claims. Rhode Island courts have not considered the
application of the Mill Dam Act in a similar factual scenario to date.
2.1.2 Dam Inspection
As is the case in other states, Rhode Island statutes provide for dam inspection, classification, and
enforcement. OCI is the primary agency responsible for administering the state statute authorizing
dam inspection and enforcement.29 The statute directs OCI to inspect and report on the condition
of every dam in the state, requires owners to furnish OCI with descriptions of and other
information about their dams, and prohibits dam construction or substantial alteration without prior
OCI approval.30 OCI is also empowered to investigate dams that may be unsafe and order and
enforce corrective actions.31 The statute authorizes judicial enforcement of corrective orders, but
does not authorize financial penalties or other liabilities for noncompliance.
In addition to authorizing inspections, the statute also provides for emergency planning. It directs
each city or town to create an emergency action plan (EAP) for each significant or high hazard dam
in its jurisdiction, at the dam owner’s expense.32 The EAPs are to follow guidelines created by the
Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency (RIEMA).33 EAPs identify property and
403 A.2d 1094, 1098 (R.I. 1979).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-18-1.
27 Mowry v. Sheldon, 2 R.I. 369, 373 (R.I. 1852) (“It is only the application, actual or intended, of the dam to mill
purposes that exempts it from the operation of the mill law.”); Howe v. Norman, 13 R.I. 488 (R.I. 1882) (enjoining
drinking water dam and declining to apply Mill Dam Act).
28 Mowry v. Sheldon, 2 R.I. 369, 376 (R.I. 1852).
29 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 46-19-1 – 46-19-9.
30 Id. §§ 46-19-1 – 46-19-3.
31 Id. §§ 46-19-4 – 46-19-8.
32 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-19-9.
33 Id., RIEMA, DAM EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN (EAP) TEMPLATE (2016).
25
26
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infrastructure likely affected by a dam failure and coordinate emergency response efforts to mitigate
damage following a dam failure.34
RIDEM has issued dam safety regulations to implement the statute.35 Among other provisions, for
example, the regulations provide for prohibitions, dam classification system, dam registration,
approval requirements for maintenance and repair, and inspections.36 The regulations also include
provisions relating to liability. First, they echo language in the Mill Dam Act that:
All current or precedent owners are responsible for liability for damage to property
of others or injury to persons, including but not limited to loss of life, resulting by
the following of the pond raised by the dam, by the stopping or raising of the water
either above or below the dam, by the backing of water or by the flowing out of any
fall of water by means of the dam.37
Unlike the Mill Dam Act, this statement of liability is not limited strictly to mill dams. Rather, its
language extends liability to all dams and all owners, regardless of purpose.38 However, this provision
appears to be unenforceable, as none of the Mill Dam Act, dam inspection statute, or any other
current statute authorizes RIDEM to create this liability.39 As a result, this provision appears to be
unenforceable as a source of liability for landowners should a dam fail or cause a flood through
other means.
The regulations do provide one additional source of liability through assessment of administrative
penalties. As authorized by statute, RIDEM can issue enforcement notices, orders, and
administrative penalties to ensure compliance with the regulations.40 These penalties are available
only to RIDEM and cannot be used to collect damages after dam-related failure or flooding.

2.2 Common Law Liability
Dam owners may liable under the common law of tort in addition to under explicit statutes. Tort
law allows parties to recover damages to compensate them for injuries caused by another.41 This
section begins by introducing principles of government liability in tort cases, an issue that applies to
R.I. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DAM EMERGENCY ACTION PLANS: A FUNCTIONAL GUIDE TO EAPS.
250 R.I. CODE R. pt. 130-05-1.
36 250 R.I. CODE R. §§ 130-05-1.7 - 1.11.
37 Id. § 1.6(B).
38 Id. § 1.6(C) (“These regulations shall not be interpreted as relieving any owner or person maintaining or having control
of a dam from responsibility.”).
39 The dam safety regulations cite several statutory chapters as authority. 250 R.I. CODE R. § 130-05-1.2. These include
chapters establishing and establishing the powers of RIDEM, R.I. GEN. LAWS ch. 42-17.1, providing for administrative
penalties for environmental violations, id. ch. 42-17.6, and the dam inspection statute itself. Id. ch. 46-19. None of these
sources of authority creates enforceable liability for violations with the exception of authorization to assess
administrative penalties of up to $1000 for failure to comply with any regulation. Id. §§ 42-17.6-1 (maximum
administrative penalty), 42-17.6-2 (authority to assess penalties). See also id. § 42-17.1-2(22) (authorizing department to
impose administrative penalties as authorized in chapter 17.6).
40 250 R.I. CODE R. §§ 130-05-1.14.
41 1 AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 1:2 (2019).
34
35
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all types of tort claims. With that introduction, it then reviews common law claims that may apply to
dam owners. It then considers regional laws to illustrate whether and how Rhode Island liability is
consistent with regional trends.
2.2.1 Government Dam Owners and Tort Liability
Rhode Island law protects governmental entities against tort liability in some cases. Historically,
governments and quasi-government entities have been protected from tort lawsuits by the principle
of sovereign immunity.42 Rhode Island has waived its sovereign immunity against tort claims by
statute, provided that certain conditions are met.43 As a result, state, local, and quasi-governmental
dam owners may be liable for tort claims.44 However, the “public-duty doctrine” continues to shield
these entities from “tort liability arising out of discretionary governmental actions that by their
nature are not ordinarily performed by private persons.”45
The purpose of a dam may determine whether its owner is shielded by the public-duty doctrine.
While relevant cases are limited, some forms of dams are ordinarily operated by private entities, such
that government entities operating these types of dams may be fully liable in tort law.46 Courts
hearing such cases could hypothetically distinguish between dams operated for purposes related to
the public safety and welfare (e.g., stormwater detention, public recreation, or abandoned dams) and
those operated for a return (e.g. water supply, hydropower). This distinction would accord with a
Rhode Island Supreme Court decision holding that “supplying water for sale” to a public works
contractor is a proprietary function.47 Under this reasoning, governments operating water supply or
hydropower dams may face greater liabilities than those operating dams for stormwater retention or
other “discretionary” purposes.
While acting as a shield against liability, the public-duty doctrine is limited in several ways.
Governments remain liable for damages: (i) when the governmental entity owes a “special duty” to
the plaintiff; and (ii) for egregious conduct.48 Damages in these instances are limited to $100,000,
whereas damages for proprietary conduct are unlimited.49 While dam operators are unlikely to have a

2 AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 6:16
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-1.
44 Id. (extending liability to “[t]he state of Rhode Island and any political subdivision thereof, including all cities and
towns”); see also id. § 9-31-3 (specifically referring to fire districts).
45 Morales v. Town of Johnston, 895 A.2d 721, 730 (R.I. 2006). See also Roach v. State, 157 A.3d 1042, 1049-51 (R.I.
2017) (explaining history and development of sovereign immunity, waiver, and public-duty doctrine in Rhode Island).
46 See Verity v. Danti, 585 A.2d 65, 66-67 (R.I. 1991) (“[I]f an action is determined to be one that a private individual
would engage in, the state's immunity is abrogated and the plaintiff's claim is not barred.”).
47 Karczmarcyzk v. Quinn, 200 A.2d 461 (R.I. 1970).
48 Kuzniar v. Keach, 709 A.2d 1050, 1053 (R.I. 1998).
49 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-31-2 (state liability); 9-31-3 (municipal and fire district liability). The legislature may authorize
damages in greater amounts. Id. § 9-31-4.
42
43
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“special duty” to specific property owners,50 government dam owners could be liable under either
the egregious conduct exception.

Figure 2. Structure of Rhode Island government tort liability doctrine.

Government dam owners may be liable for egregious conduct if they are aware that a dam is or may
be unsafe and fails to address the hazard. The egregious conduct exception applies “when the state
has knowledge that it has created a circumstance that forces an individual into a position of peril and
subsequently chooses not to remedy the situation.”51 To prevail on an egregious-conduct claim, the
plaintiff must show that the government entity created “circumstances that forced a reasonably
prudent person into a position of extreme peril,” had “actual or constructive knowledge of the
perilous circumstances,” and failed to address the dangerous condition within a reasonable amount
of time.”52
While no egregious conduct cases related to dams have been decided to date in Rhode Island, the
2017 Oroville Dam disaster provides a pertinent example of a dam near-failure that was preceded by
knowledge of the hazard. According to news reports, environmental groups had previously
challenged the dam’s federal relicensing due to the risk of spillway failure, but California (the dam
owner) asserted that spillway upgrades were unnecessary as the dam was designed consistent with
the probable maximum flood.53 As predicted, the spillway eroded catastrophically when placed in
use, resulting in the evacuation of 185,000 people.54 Like many potential egregious-conduct cases,
See Quality Court Condominium Ass’n v. Quality Hill Dev. Corp., 641 A.2d 746, 750 (R.I. 1994) (“In cases in which
this court has acknowledged the existence of a special duty, the plaintiffs have had some form of prior contact with state
or municipal officials ‘who then knowingly embarked on a course of conduct that endangered the plaintiffs, or they have
otherwise specifically come within the knowledge of the officials so that the injury to that particularly identified plaintiff
can be or should have been foreseen.’”) (quoting Knudsen v. Hall, 490 A.2d 976, 978 (R.I. 1985)). It is possible, though
perhaps unlikely, that a landowner could establish a special duty based on contacts between the injured landowner and
the dam operator.
51 Verity v. Danti, 585 A.2d 65, 67 (R.I. 1991).
52 Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 849 (R.I. 1992).
53 Paul Rogers, Oroville Dam: Feds and State Officials Ignored Warnings 12 Years Ago, THE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 12, 2017.
54 Id.
50
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this situation would raise issues of fact and law that would need to be decided in court.55 However,
similar foreknowledge of potential risks—as revealed by OCI dam inspections or other means—
could expose government dam owners to liability if they do not adequately carry out required
maintenance or responsibilities to create EAPs for high and significant hazard dams.
2.2.2 Sources of Common Law Liability in Rhode Island
Plaintiffs may raise a variety of common law claims against dam owners after dam failure or
flooding. This section reviews five types of tort claims to dam owners, including absolute liability,
negligence, private nuisance, conversion, and trespass claims. One or more of these claims may
apply to specific factual circumstances. However, there are few cases in Rhode Island specifically
applying these claims to dam owners. As a result, the applicability of some claims to dam owners will
be uncertain until additional cases are decided by the state courts.
2.2.2.1 Strict Liability
Abnormally dangerous activities are subject to strict liability in Rhode Island.56 Strict liability is
“liability irrespective of negligence.”57 It applies “when a plaintiff's injuries are proximately caused by
some ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity of the defendant.”58 Therefore, strict liability
will only be applied if a dam is deemed abnormally dangerous by a court.59 Rhode Island determines
whether an activity is ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous by considering six factors set out in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
(a) existence of high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of
others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.60
These factors are not essential in every case; rather, the weight and application of each factor varies
based on the facts of a specific case.61 However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized
that the potential harm must be serious, and “an activity is not abnormally dangerous if the risks
Tedesco v. Connors, 871 A.2d 920, 924-25 (R.I. 2005) (holding that egregious conduct is mixed question of law and
fact).
56 Splendorio v. Bilray Demolition Co., 682 A.2d 461, 465-66 (R.I. 1996).
57 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (“The defendant is held liable although he has exercised the
utmost care to prevent the harm to the plaintiff that has ensued.”); J.B. Glen, Annotation, Liability for Overflow or Escape of
Water from Reservoir, Ditch or Artificial Pond, 169 A.L.R. 517 (1947).
58 Selwyn v. Ward, 879 A.2d 882, 889 (R.I. 2005).
59 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (“The liability arises out of the abnormal danger of the activity
itself, and the risk that it creates, of harm to those in the vicinity.”)
60 Splendorio, 682 A.2d at 466 (quoting 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977)).
61 Id.
55
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therefrom could be limited by the exercise of reasonable care.”62 If a dam meets these conditions, its
owner could be liable for damages resulting from dam-related floods or failures regardless of
whether the owner was negligent or exercised due care.
Rhode Island courts have never decided whether operation of a dam is an ultrahazardous or
abnormally dangerous activity. However, “water collected in quantity in [an] unsuitable or dangerous
place” is a recognized type of abnormally dangerous activity in other jurisdictions.63 If faced with
such a case, Rhode Island courts would assess the hazards—and the defendant’s ability to manage
those hazards—along with the appropriateness of the dam for its location and its benefits to the
community.64 This determination could result in different outcomes for different dams. For
example, public water supply dams might be more likely than privately held recreational dams to
avoid strict liability based on their benefit to society. On the other hand, a dam located above a town
center may be more likely to be ultrahazardous due to the catastrophic consequences of failure.65 In
all cases, however, a dam owner may defend against a finding of absolute liability by showing that
risk could be limited by use of reasonable care.
While strict liability does not require the plaintiff to show that the dam owner was at fault, it
nonetheless has relevant defenses. The “Act of God” defense is the most relevant, and protects
against liability for extreme events, including catastrophic floods that are “plainly beyond the
capacity of any one to anticipate.”66 Rhode Island courts recognize the Act of God defense,
including in the context of catastrophic storms.67 However, the courts have not defined the doctrine
as it relates to storm frequency, and our expanding ability to predict storm intensity and return
periods may affect future cases. As a result, the determination of whether a storm event is an Act of
God will be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Assumption of risk may be a second defense in strict liability cases for abnormally dangerous
activities. Rhode Island courts have not ruled on the application of assumption of risk in strict

Id.; see also Selwyn, 879 A.2d at 890 (“abnormally dangerous activities are those that cannot be made safe by the use of
due care”).
63 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 rpt. note (1977) (collecting cases).
64 The Restatement speaks specifically to the risks of dams based on their locations. “There are some highly dangerous
activities, that necessarily involve a risk of serious harm in spite of all possible care, that can be carried on only in a
particular place… a dam impounding water in a stream can be situated only in the bed of the stream. If these activities
are of sufficient value to the community . . . , they may not be regarded as abnormally dangerous when they are so
located, since the only place where the activity can be carried on must necessarily be regarded as an appropriate one.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 520 cmt. j (1977).
65 See Denis Binder, Legal Liability for Dam Failures 27 (2002) (unpublished manuscript) (“the collection and storage of
a large quantity of water on a hillside reservoir upstream from a residential community may well constitute an abnormally
dangerous activity. The consequences of such a breach are likely to be catastrophic.”).
66 Golden v. Amory, 109 N.E.2d 131, 133 (Mass. 1952).
67 Indus. Park Water Co. v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 2005 WL 372298, at *6 (R.I. 2005); Howard v. Union R. Co., 57 A. 867,
868-69 (R.I. 1904); see also Uniroyal, Inc. v. Hood, 588 F.2d 454, 460 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[A]n act of God is an accident
caused by physical causes which are irresistible or inevitable, such as lightning, storms, perils of the sea, earthquakes and
inundations”).
62
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liability cases, but the defense is accepted in a variety of other jurisdictions.68 If accepted, this
defense would likely have the same elements as under negligence (see infra), and thus would require
actual knowledge and acceptance of an unreasonable risk of harm.69 The defense would not be
available against downstream property owners who predated a dam,70 but could apply against
subsequent purchasers of flood-prone properties. As a result, the assumption of risk defense may be
available where a dam owner can show that a property owner purchased their property in full
knowledge of its unreasonable risk of flooding.
2.2.2.2 Negligence
A dam owner may be liable for negligence resulting in downstream or upstream flooding.71 Plaintiffs
in negligence cases must satisfy several elements to prove liability. Specifically, injured parties must
show that the defendant: (i) owes them a legally-cognizable duty; (ii) breached that duty; and (iii)
proximately caused an injury as a result of that breach.72 No Rhode Island court has adjudicated a
negligence case against a dam owner to date, but most jurisdictions recognize negligence claims in
such cases.73 As a result, it is likely that a state court would recognize this tort, particularly in cases
where strict liability or other forms of relief do not apply.
Courts that have considered negligence claims for dam-related flooding have found that dam owners
have a legal duty to “exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent dam owner.”74 The extent of a duty
depends on the foreseeable risks of an activity.75 In the case of dams, this duty is likely to be
substantial, especially in significant or high hazard dams where the consequences of failure are
severe.76 Plaintiffs could show that the owner breached that duty by presenting a variety of evidence,
such as failing to conduct routine maintenance or to manage a dam appropriately.77 The evidence
used to show a breach may vary, but could include, for example, failure to comply with an EAP or
inspections showing maintenance failures.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 523 (1977).
Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 376 A.2d 329, 332 (R.I. 1977).
70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 523 cmt. f (1977) (“A possessor of land is not required to abandon the land and
move away from it, merely because the defendant has set up a powder mill in such proximity to it that there is danger in
the continued use of the land.”).
71 EDWARD A. THOMAS, ASS’N OF S TATE FLOODPLAIN M ANAGERS, LIABILITY FOR W ATER CONTROL S TRUCTURE
FAILURE DUE TO FLOODING (2006).
72 Flynn v. Nickerson Community Center, 177 A.3d 468, 476 (R.I. 2018).
73 J.B. Glen, Annotation, Liability for Overflow or Escape of Water from Reservoir, Ditch or Artificial Pond, 169 A.L.R 517.
74 Hoosac Tunnel & W. R. Co. v. New England Power Co., 42 N.E.2d 832, 835 (Mass. 1942).
75 Splendorio v. Bilray Demolition Co., 682 A.2d 461, 466 (R.I. 1996) (“The linchpin in determining the existence of any
duty owed . . . was the foreseeability of the risk of injury to them by [defendant’s] actions. ‘The risk reasonably to be
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of
apprehension.’” (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Builders Specialty Co. v. Goulet, 639 A.2d 59, 60 (R.I.
1994)).
76 THOMAS, supra note 71, at 10 (citing Ezra Ripley Thayer, Liability Without Fault, 29 HARV. L. REV. 801, 805 (1916))
(“[T]he duty of care in circumstances where life and limb were at stake is the highest possible”).
77 See, e.g., Whipple v. Wanskuck Co., 12 R.I. 321 (R.I. 1879) (upholding negligence claim by dam owner against dam
tenant for destruction of dam due to failure to open spillway); THOMAS, supra note 71, at 11-12 (discussing importance
of dam inspection to show a breach of duty).
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Plaintiffs must show that the defendant’s actions proximately caused injuries in order to prevail in a
negligence claim.78 Causation may not be in dispute in many cases, including those involving dam
failure. However, causation may be contested where a flood would have occurred regardless of
whether the dam was present or where an upstream dam failure causes a cascade of downstream
failures.79 If the damages would have occurred without the dam present, the dam owner will not be
liable for damages caused by flooding. Similarly, dam owners are not responsible for damages
resulting from acts of God, as this defense applies to negligence claims in the same manner as to
strict liability claims (see supra).80
“Assumption of risk” may also prevent liability in negligence cases involving dam-related flooding.
A defendant is not liable for negligence in cases where the plaintiff “knowingly accepts a dangerous
situation.”81 To prevail, the defendant must “stablish that plaintiff knew of the existence of a danger,
appreciated its unreasonable character, and then voluntarily exposed himself to it.”82 A plaintiff must
have actual knowledge of the risk and its unreasonableness in order to assume it83 In cases where
actual knowledge is lacking but the plaintiff objectively should have known of the risk, they may be
contributorily negligent.84
2.2.2.3 Private Nuisance
Dam owners may be subject to private nuisance claims if their dams unreasonably and materially
interfere with the use and enjoyment of neighboring properties.85 Nuisance differs from negligence
because “a nuisance claim is predicated upon an unreasonable injury rather than unreasonable
conduct.”86 As a result, a nuisance claim can succeed even if the defendant did not act in a negligent
way.87 To succeed on a private nuisance claim, an injured party must prove: (1) existence of a

Flynn, 177 A.3d at 476.
THOMAS, supra note 71, at 13-14; Beauton v. Conn. Light & Power, 3 A.2d 315, 319 (Conn. 1938) (“While the
plaintiffs were entitled to the customary flow of the river and the defendant had no right to accelerate substantially the
flow of the water beyond the natural capacity of its banks, yet you will bear in mind that the plaintiff has to prove that
such acceleration or increase was caused by the defendant and caused the injuries claimed; and if the flood that caused
the damages was created solely by storm and weather conditions and the conduct of the defendant as alleged did not
contribute substantially or essentially to cause it, the defendant would not be liable.”).
80 J.B. Glen, Annotation, Liability for Overflow or Escape of Water from Reservoir, Ditch or Artificial Pond, 169 A.L.R 517;
Beauton, 3 A.2d at 318.
81 Sheehan v. The N. Am. Mktg. Corp., 610 F.3d 144, 151 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club,
Inc., 376 A.2d 329, 333 (R.I. 1977).
82 Drew v. Wall, 495 A.2d 229, 231 (R.I. 1985).
83 Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 376 A.2d 329, 332 (R.I. 1977).
84 Id. at 332-33 (discussing distinction between assumption of risk and contributory negligence). Note that contributory
negligence is not available to limit damages in strict liability cases. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 524 (1977).
85 Citizens for Preservation of Waterman Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d 53, 59 (R.I. 1980); Weida v. Ferry, 493 A.2d 824, 826
(R.I. 1985).
86 Weida, 493 A.2d at 826.
87 Id.
78
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nuisance; and (2) injury caused by the nuisance.88 The injury must be a material harm to an interest
in property.89
Rhode Island recognizes that flooding can be a nuisance.90 As a result, it is possible that dam-related
flooding could result in private nuisance claims. However, there are several reasons to doubt that
private nuisance claims would be effective in the context of dam failure or floods associated with
severe storms.
1. Rhode Island law limits nuisance claims to contemporaneous uses of neighboring property.91
Downstream or upstream flooding may not satisfy this requirement.
2. Private nuisance is intended to cover a continuous activity rather than a rare or intermittent
one.92 Flooding is likely to be a single or rare event rather than a continuous one, and thus
will not qualify as a nuisance in most cases.
3. Owners could argue that upstream or downstream owners in the floodplain “came to the
nuisance” when they bought their property. The doctrine of “coming to the nuisance”
protects existing activities (e.g., dams) against challenges by later-arriving landowners.93 In
Rhode Island, coming to a nuisance is “one factor that may be considered in determining” if
a defendant’s activity is unreasonable and thus a nuisance.94 In the context of dam-related
flooding, dam owners could assert that plaintiffs purchased their property with known risk
that it could be flooded.
4. Owners could argue that a storm is an Act of God.
Based on these defenses, private nuisance claims appear unlikely to succeed in the context of many
dam flooding disputes.
In addition to flood claims, plaintiffs have used nuisance to challenge drawdown of impounded
waters. In Hood v. Slefkin, the Rhode Island Supreme Court overturned an injunction requiring a dam
owner to maintain the water level on Lebanon Pond at its historic level and seeking damages for

Citizens for Preservation of Waterman Lake, 420 A.2d at 59.
Id. (“The law does not attempt to impose liability in every case in which one person's conduct has some detrimental
effect on another. Liability is imposed only in those cases in which the harm or risk to one is greater than he ought to be
required to bear under the circumstances.”); Iafrate v. Ramsden, 190 A.2d 473, 476 (R.I. 1963).
90 Butler v. Bruno, 341 A.2d 735, 740 n.6 (R.I. 1975) (“[T]he invasion of one's property by surface waters can be a
nuisance, no different from an invasion by noise, noxious vapors, or the like.”).
91 Hydro-Manufacturing, 640 A.2d at 957 (quoting Weida v. Ferry, 493 A.2d 824, 826 (R.I. 1985)) (“[A] private nuisance
‘arises from the unreasonable use of one’s property that materially interfere with a neighbor’s physical comfort or the
neighbor’s use of his real estate.’”).
92 Hennessey v. Pyne, 694 A.2d 691, 695 (R.I. 1997) (“[A]n isolated incident is not the type of conduct that nuisance law
is intended to remedy.”).
93 Tuttle v. Church, 53 F. 422, 426 (D.R.I. 1892) (“If one voluntarily moves into a town or neighborhood where smoke
or noxious gases abound, it may be presumed that he does so for sufficient reasons, and he should not be permitted to
come into a court of equity and restrain the prosecution of industries already established, and upon which the business
interests and welfare of the community may depend.”).
94 Weida, 493 A.2d at 827.
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exposure of noxious sediments.95 The court declined to find nuisance damages because the odors
emanating from the exposed “muck” were caused by an upstream sewage disposal plant rather than
by the dam owner.96
2.2.2.4 Conversion
Dam owners may be liable to an injured party for the conversion of chattel. Conversion is “the
intentional exercise of dominion or control” over the personal property of another that “so seriously
interferes with the right of another to control it that the [defendant] may justly be required to pay
the other the full value of the chattel.”97 Conversion claims are limited strictly to tangible objects and
do not include real property.98 Dam owners thus could be held liable for damage to possessions in
conversion claims, but not to loss of the use of land.
Conversion claims are likely to succeed against dam owners only in limited situations. To succeed on
a conversion claim, an injured party must establish: (i) that they possessed the property; and (ii) that
the defendant intentionally exercised control over the property without consent.99 In many instances,
including dam failure, it is unlikely that plaintiffs will be able to prove intent by a dam owner to
control the property. However, a conversion claim may exist where a dam owner intentionally
releases dam waters in the knowledge that they will inundate downstream properties. In addition,
plaintiffs may also be able to show intent in cases where dam owners do not obtain upstream
property that is likely to be flooded at times, as in the Addicks and Barker dam cases.
2.2.2.5 Trespass
Occupation of land by impounded waters behind a dam or flood waters released from a dam may
constitute a trespass. Trespass is the intentional entry onto the property of another without
consent.100 Continuing trespass is defined as the “unprivileged remaining on land in another’s
property.”101 Notably, trespass does not require the plaintiff to show injury associated with the
trespass—mere entry is enough to recover.102 Recovery may take the form of money damages or, for
continuing trespasses, an injunction.103 Rhode Island courts have held that the invasion of water
onto another’s property is a trespass.104 Thus, while no Rhode Island court has adjudicated a trespass
claim related to dam operations, future floods could include this claim in instances where dam

143 A.2d 683 (R.I. 1958).
Id. at 687-88.
97 Montecalvo v. Mandarelli, 682 A.2d 918, 928 (R.I. 1996); see also Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Carbone, 898 A.2d 87, 97
(R.I. 2006).
98 Montecalvo, 682 A.2d at 928.
99 Id.
100 Bennett v. Napolitano, 746 A.2d 138, 141 (R.I. 2000).
101 City of Providence v. Doe, 21 A.3d 315 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Mesollela v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661, 668 n.8
(R.I. 1986)).
102 Newstone Dev., LLC v. East Pacific, LLC, 140 A.3d 100, 105-06 (R.I. 2016).
103 Id.
104 Klowan v. Howard, 113 A.2d 872, 874 (R.I. 1955); Lombeau, Inc. v. Woerner, 2005 WL 2476227, at *5 (R.I. Super.
2005).
95
96

14

owners cause flooding by detaining or releasing flood waters with the intent to flood upstream or
downstream property.

2.3 Constitutional Liability
In addition to statutory and tort claims, government dam owners may be subject to constitutional
liability if they violate the constitutional rights of a property owner whose land is flooded. This
section reviews potential liabilities for violations of the takings clause and for civil rights violations.
2.3.1 Takings
Flooding due to government-controlled dam operations may constitute a taking in violation of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Fifth Amendment states that “private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”105 Takings liability requires
an invasion of private property that is “the direct, natural, or probable result of authorized
government action.”106 Thus, state and local governments and officials may be liable for their
actions, though not for inaction or failure to act,107 while private dam owners are not subject to
takings liability at all.
Flooding as a result of government dam management actions may be a taking. The Supreme Court
has held that upstream flooding resulting from dam construction is a form of physical occupation
subject to liability,108 as is seasonally-recurring flooding caused by dam operations.109 On the other
hand, the Court declined to find a taking for flooding after construction of a canal because the
flooding was not foreseeable and the property owner did not show that the canal caused the
flooding.110 In 2012, the Supreme Court decided Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States, in
which the Army Corps of Engineers intentionally deviated from its dam manual over several years,
flooding a hardwood forest and resulting in the loss of valuable timber owned by the state.111 The
Court found that temporary flooding can be a taking and identified several factors to consider when
determining if a flood event is a taking. These factors include: (1) duration of the flood, (2) the
degree to which the flood was “intended or [] the foreseeable result of authorized” government
action; and (3) severity of the interference with the use of property.112 Under these precedents,
takings cases associated with flooding from dams will be decided on a case-by-case basis. Intentional
or foreseeable temporary flooding of private property caused by affirmative government actions may

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. U.S., 887 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
107 Id.
108 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1872) (“where real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions
of water, earth, sand, or other material ... so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the
meaning of the Constitution.”).
109 U.S. v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
110 Sanguinetti v. U.S., 264 U.S. 146 (1924).
111 568 U.S. 23, 27-28 (2012).
112 Id. at 38-39.
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result in liability, particularly where those decisions result in severe impacts on affected property
owners that would not have occurred but for the dam.
2.3.2 Section 1983
Governments may be liable under “section 1983” claims related to dam operations. Section 1983 is a
federal statute that authorizes civil actions against the government for “deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”113 To prevail on a section 1983
claim, the plaintiff must first show that government action violated a protected right and “was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.”114 Deprivation of life and property are
protected rights under the Constitution and may result in liability under section 1983.115 However,
not any injury is severe enough to violate due process: the Supreme Court has “observed repeatedly
that the Due Process Clause is not a substitute for traditional tort remedies.”116
Only those behaviors that “shock the conscience” result in violations of substantive due process and
thus trigger liability under section 1983.117 Whether an action shocks the conscience depends on the
circumstances. In most instances, negligent actions are not enough118—actions must be “egregious
and outrageous” to shock the conscience.119 The courts have noted that context matters, however; in
non-emergency situations “where actors have an opportunity to reflect and make reasoned and
rational decisions,” deliberate indifference to the danger may suffice to shock the conscience.120
Section 1983 liability applies to municipalities121 and municipal officials “acting under color of state
law,”122 but does not apply to states or state officials.123 To prevail against a municipality, a plaintiff
must identify a municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused the plaintiff’s injury.124 Liability against
municipalities can arise if a policy or custom itself violates federal law, or if the municipality fails to
train its employees.125 Municipal officers are also subject to limited liability under section 1983.
However, officers are protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity unless they are “plainly
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
115 Ramos-Pinero v. Puerto Rico, 453 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2006) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids a state from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 53.
118 Id. at 53 (citing Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998).
119 Melendez-Garcia v. Sanchez, 629 F.3d 25, 37 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
120 Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 2005); J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 80 (1st Cir. 2010).
121 Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 51 (1st Cir. 2011) (requiring plaintiff to show that “through its deliberate
conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (emphasis in original))).
122 West, 487 U.S. at 49-50 (“[G]enerally, a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official
capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.”).
123 Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 68-71 (1989).
124 Haley, 657 F.3d at 49-50.
125 Id. at 51-52 (“Triggering municipal liability on a claim of failure to train requires a showing that municipal
decisionmakers either knew or should have known that training was inadequate but nonetheless exhibited deliberate
indifference to the unconstitutional effects of those inadequacies.”).
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incompetent” or knowingly violate the plaintiff’s rights.126 Based on these precedents, local
governments, quasi-municipal entities such as fire districts, and municipal officers such as police or
dam keepers could be liable in some instances if their actions result in flooding.
In limited circumstances, governments may be liable under section 1983 for the actions of a third
party.127 While the default rule is that governments are not liable for actions of private parties, “when
the state creates the danger to an individual, an affirmative duty to protect might arise.”128 Under
federal law applicable in Rhode Island, “state-created danger” claims require plaintiffs to show that a
government official took an affirmative action that was the proximate cause of the injury, as well as
that the actions “shock the conscience.”129 This standard is difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy, but
plaintiffs have prevailed in some instances in non-emergency situations.130
Section 1983 has been asserted against municipal and county governments and officials in one dam
liability case to date. In Van Orden v. Borough of Woodstown, a borough in New Jersey opened a
floodgate at the Veterans Memorial Lake Dam “‘to relieve pressure and control flood waters’ as
Hurricane Irene approached.”131 The borough announced that it would open the floodgates but did
not block the road in its path or take other steps to prevent drivers from using it.132 When it was
opened, a driver was drowned.133 The court initially declined to dismiss the case, finding that
borough took affirmative action that could have foreseeably and directly caused the plaintiff’s death
and could shock the conscience.134 However, the court eventually issued a summary judgment for
the defendants because the evidence did not support a finding that the government acted in a
deliberately indifferent manner.135 The development and use of an EAP and engineering analysis
were important evidence supporting the court’s conclusion.136 While not resulting in liability, this
case suggests that the state-created danger doctrine could result in liability for governments in some
scenarios.
Rhode Island municipalities and officers could be held liable under section 1983 for damage to life
and property caused by dam-related flooding by their own actions or by creating danger caused by a
private party. Rhode Island law requires municipalities to develop EAPs,137 and local government
entities may have additional policies or customs in operating their own dams or those owned by
Id. at 47 (quoting Mallet v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
128 Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d 27, 34-35 (1st Cir. 2005).
129 Id. at 34-37.
130 Doe v. Town of Wayland, 179 F.Supp.3d 155 (D. Mass. 2016).
131 5 F.Supp.3d 676, 679 (D.N.J. 2014).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 681-84 (“Releasing “raging flood water” capable of enveloping roads and bridges and causing serious bodily
injury or death, without taking safety measures to protect citizens, certainly could be considered conduct that shocks the
conscience.”).
135 Van Orden v. Borough of Woodstown, NJ, 2016 bWL 6662682 (D.N.J. 2016), aff’d 703 Fed. Appx. 153 (3d Cir.
2017).
136 Id. at *9-*10.
137 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-19-9.
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private parties. Failure to create EAPs, use of policies or customs that foreseeably could result in
deprivation of life or property (e.g., maintaining reservoir levels so high that the dam could
foreseeably require opening emergency spillway in a storm), or failure to train employees on these
policies or customs could all plausibly result in liability for direct actions by the municipality or its
officers. On the other hand, developing and using EAPs can reduce the likelihood of liability should
serious harm result from a dam management decision. This may be particularly true in emergency
situations where towns or officers direct private parties to act in ways that result in injury. In such
cases, courts are likely to require that the actions be truly egregious before finding liability. However,
liability is not impossible even in these cases—for example, refusal to allow a dam owner to open a
spillway, contrary to an EAP, that results in dam failure could be egregious conduct. Thus, the
liability implications of section 1983 are likely to be decided on the facts of each particular case.

Analysis
Different dams and dam owners are subject to different types of liability in Rhode Island. This
section discusses these differences and examines how management decisions, such as intentional
release and floodplain development under dams, affect liability.

3.1 Liability by Dam Type
Dam type may determine liability under certain claims. While most forms of liability do not turn on
the purpose of a dam (e.g., flood control, power, water supply), some forms of liability are affected.
This section discusses instances where dam purpose affects liability, including: (1) liability under the
Mill Dam Act; (2) liability as an abnormally dangerous activity; and (3) government damages
exposure under tort law.
The Mill Dam Act does not apply to dams not used for power, and therefore may not result in
liability for owners or operators of other types of dams, such as those used for water supply or
stormwater detention. The language and subsequent application of the Mill Dam Act is predicated
on the intended use of the dam to power a mill. While courts have rarely been called upon to
determine the applicability of the Act in recent decades, prior precedents indicate that it does not
apply to dams specifically raised for other purposes, such as irrigation. Moreover, dams that were
previously used for mills but now are used for other purposes may not be covered by the Act. As a
result, the Act’s liability provisions do not appear to apply to dams raised and used for purposes
such as water supply or recreation.
The purpose of a dam may affect its status as an abnormally dangerous activity under tort law.
Application of absolute liability is based on the six factors identified in Splendorio v. Bilray Demolition
Co., including the “extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.”138 Dams differ in their value to the community; for example, a water supply dams may
have critical value to the public, whereas a recreational, privately-operated hydropower dam, or
Splendorio v. Bilray Demolition Co., 682 A.2d 461, 466. (R.I. 1996) (quoting 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §
520 (1977)).
138
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derelict dam would have less or no value. While status as an abnormally dangerous activity depends
on more than this one factor, dams serving community functions may be less likely to trigger
absolute liability. In such cases, these dams would be subject to liability under other grounds,
notably including negligence.
Finally, the purpose of a dam affects the damages available in tort claims against government
defendants. Recovery for tort claims in these cases is capped at $100,000 unless the government is
engaging in “proprietary conduct,” which may include the sale of water or other activities that can
be and are elsewhere carried out by private companies. Thus, the tort liability exposure of
government-owned water supply or hydroelectric dams may be greater than of dams used for “nonproprietary” functions such as flood control or stormwater retention.

3.2 Liability by Owner Type
Application of liability is often dependent on the dam’s owner. In particular, government and private
dam owners are subject to different liabilities under the Constitution and tort law.
Constitutional claims are only available against government entities. As a result, takings claims and
section 1983 claims can be brought successfully against state, local, and quasi-governmental entities,
but not against private entities. These claims thus are available in flooding cases related to
government-owned or government-operated dams and may also be available where governments act
affirmatively to direct actions by private dam owners, resulting in foreseeable injuries.
While they have heightened exposure based on constitutional claims, government dam owners are
protected from tort liability in many cases by sovereign immunity. The public-duty doctrine protects
government entities while exercising discretionary functions, which likely include operation of dams
for purposes not performed by private entities. Government entities may still be liable in tort law if
they have a special duty to a particular plaintiff or act in an egregious manner, but in such instances
their damage exposure is limited to just $100,000. Under these precedents, government entities may
be protected from tort law, but these protections are limited and by no means guaranteed.
Unlike takings and tort claims, all dam owners are subject to the same statutory liability. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court has held that the government is subject to the Mill Dam Act.139 Additionally,
RIDEM regulations do not distinguish among owners for application of liability.140 Accordingly,
statutory liability does not vary among government, quasi-government or private dam owners under
the Mill Dam Act or the Dam Safety regulations.

3.3 Intentional Drawdowns Under Rhode Island Law
Dam owners may desire to draw down impoundment levels to mitigate the risk of dam failure or
overtopping caused by intensifying precipitation. These drawdowns could occur on a short-term
basis when specific storms are forecasted. Other dams that cannot rapidly alter levels may instead
139
140
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consider seasonal drawdowns. Drawdowns by Rhode Island dam owners may trigger both approval
requirements and potential liability, as described in this section.
Drawdowns in Rhode Island are subject to the Fresh Water Wetlands Act (Wetlands Act). The Act
recognizes that dam impoundments create wetlands,141 and dam owners therefore must obtain
approval from RIDEM before conducting activities that may alter those wetlands—including
drawdowns.142 While not listed as an exemption in the regulations, RIDEM also does not require
approval for “grandfathered” regular drawdowns that predate the Wetlands Act and continue
today.143 Other relevant exceptions to the approval requirement include:
•
•
•

maintenance of municipal drinking water impoundments “within the boundary perimeters of
the impoundment,” with notice to the Department;
“[m]aintenance, repair and emergency repair of high hazard and significant hazard dams”
that do not substantially alter the dam; and
“limited maintenance” of low hazard dams and “[i]nspection, maintenance and repair to any
water control structure” in them.144

While a written application is generally required for approval of non-exempted activities,145 RIDEM
regulations also provide for oral approval of emergency alterations (e.g., on low hazard dams)
provided that they do not result in a permanent alteration of the wetlands except as allowed for dam
safety by the Department.146 Thus, post-storm emergency repairs are possible without approval or
with oral approval, but dam owners must file a complete application and obtain approval from the
Department for both pre-storm and increased seasonal drawdowns. Approval and any associated
conditions will require owners to avoid and mitigate harm to the wetlands, which could affect the
usefulness of this strategy in the state.
Drawdowns can be challenged by neighboring landowners even if approved by RIDEM. As noted
in section 2.2.2.3, one such case has been brought in Rhode Island to date. In Hood v. Slefkin, the
state Supreme Court found that owners of lands bordering impounded waters do not obtain a
property interest in those water levels, so the dam owner cannot be forced to maintain the lake at a
particular level.147 In addition, the dam owner was not required to compensate the abutters for
nuisance damages caused by the exposure of noxious muck discharged from an upstream sewage
plant.148 As a result, the state appears unwilling to require dam owners to maintain particular lake

250 R.I. CODE R. § 150-15-1.2.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2-1-21.
143 E-mail from David Chopy, R.I. Dep’t Envtl. Mgmt., to author (Oct. 9, 2019).
144 Id.; 250 R.I. CODE R. § 150-15-1.6.
145 250 R.I. CODE R. § 150-15-1.10.
146 250 R.I. CODE R. § 150-15-1.11.
147 143 A.2d 683, 687 (R.I. 1958). (“Those owners of land which is overflowed by the erection of a dam, the owner of
which has acquired the right by prescription to so continue to overflow their land, gain no reciprocal right to require that
owner to maintain the dam or the water level of the pond formed thereby.”).
148 Id.
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levels in the abstract, so that state dam owners with RIDEM approval can generally conduct
drawdowns without liability from abutting landowners.
Drawdowns affect not only lands abutting the impoundment, but also downstream properties,
which may be flooded. Preemptive releases are likely to be liable for intentional torts such trespass if
they inundate downstream properties, and additional torts such as conversion, private nuisance, and
negligence if they cause damage and meet the other elements required for each claim. Similarly,
temporary inundations by government entities that result in harm may be takings, as in Arkansas
Game and Fish.149 Planning for releases in timing and amount of preemptive drawdowns may be
needed to avoid flood damage and associated liability.
If preemptive releases do cause flood injuries, dam owners may have difficulty defending resulting
claims because causation will be relatively easy for plaintiffs to prove. In preemptive release cases,
the flooding occurs before a storm event, and can clearly be causally connected with the dam
owner’s management decision rather than a force of nature. On the other hand, flooding during or
after a storm may or may not be causally connected to the dam. Dam owners will escape liability if
they can show that flooding would have occurred in the absence of the dam. In this sense,
prophylactic management to limit the risk of dam failure from anticipated storms may perversely
increase the risk of liability unless carefully managed to avoid downstream flooding.

3.4 Liability Based on Floodplain Development
Floodplain development can change whether and how dam owners are liable for flooding. In many
cases, Rhode Island dams were constructed when the number of people and structures affected by a
dam release or failure was more limited than today. Floodplain development has changed the
potential for injury to people and property resulting from dam releases, with consequences for the
potential liabilities and defenses of dam owners. In particular, floodplain development may affect
whether a dam is abnormally dangerous and whether the defenses of assumption of risk and coming
to the nuisance are available.
Floodplain development may affect whether a dam is considered abnormally dangerous. A dam may
become abnormally dangerous over time due to increased potential harm upon failure; indeed, the
risk associated with failure is the basis for RIDEM’s dam classification scheme. As a result,
downstream developments may make dam owners more likely to be subject to strict liability in tort.
On the other hand, development does not appear likely to affect the viability of negligence,
conversion, or trespass claims. However, development will increase the damages associated with
these tort claims.
Floodplain development may enable dam owners to assert the affirmative defenses of assumption of
risk and coming to the nuisance when facing certain tort claims. However, these defenses have
challenges for dam owners. Assumption of risk requires actual knowledge and acceptance of an
unreasonable risk. In most cases, floodplain development will not be so obviously at risk of flooding
149

568 U.S. 23 (2012).

21

that property owners cannot avoid knowing their risk as a matter of law. As a result, the defense may
not be successful in most cases. Contributory negligence does not require actual knowledge of risk
and thus may be more applicable, but it is only available in negligence cases. It is also possible the
doctrine of “coming to the nuisance” may limit private nuisance claims.150 However, the doctrine is
not a total bar against claims with similar facts, but rather is “one factor that may be considered in
determining whether or not a defendant's or a respondent's conduct was an unlawful interference
with a neighbor's real estate.”151 In practice, therefore, tort claims will remain highly fact-intensive
and dependent on the actions and practices of dam owners and other responsible parties.

Dam Liability in a Regional Context
A regional perspective is useful to assess the extent to which Rhode Island law is consistent with
broader trends in liability affecting dam owners. While most claims discussed in the previous section
are available in other states, their implementation and details may differ. This section focuses on
three areas of particular relevance and difference from state to state, which were selected based on
stakeholder feedback. These include: (i) the applicability of statutory liability provisions to dam
owners after storms; (ii) whether strict liability or nuisance applies to dam flooding cases; and (iii)
whether states have limited drawdowns through injunctive relief or damages. For each topic, this
section reviews provisions in nearby states before drawing comparisons with Rhode Island law.

4.1 Statutory Liability Provisions
Rhode Island’s statutory liability provisions can best be understood in the context of similar laws in
other states. As the Rhode Island Supreme Court explained, the Mill Dam Act is consistent with
similar legislation in other states:
For the promotion of manufactures, Legislatures in most of the states have enacted
so-called “Mill Acts,” giving to a riparian proprietor upon a stream, where water
power may be utilized, the right to increase the impelling force of the current at his
land by the erection of a dam and the setting back of the water of the stream beyond
the limit of his own land and upon that of a proprietor above, with provision for
compensation in damages, and with the restriction, generally expressed in the act,
that a proprietor cannot flow back and obstruct the operation of a mill privilege
above which has already been established by authority of law.152
Similarly, other states also have dam safety provisions of more recent vintage. This section considers
the status of statutory liability in other Northeast states to illustrate the extent to which the limits on
liability under Rhode Island law are consistent with nearby states, with a focus on “flowage acts.”

Weida v. Ferry, 493 A.2d 824, 826-27 (R.I. 1985).
Id. at 827.
152 Slatersville Finishing Co. v. Greene, 101 A. 226, 228 (R.I. 1917).
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•

Connecticut has established a flowage statute providing for payment of damages caused by
impoundment of waters behind new dams.153 This statute provides a process for determining
whether the proposed dam is of public use and, if so, for determining the damages owed by
its owner to the upstream property owner.154 Unlike mill acts in other northeast states, the
Connecticut flowage law does not include a general statement of dam owner liability. As a
result, injured property owners cannot use this statute to recover damages for storm-related
flooding caused by dams.

•

The Massachusetts Mill Act provides a statutory action for landowners to seek compensation
for damages caused by the creation of dams in the state.155 The Act does not create new
claims for damages, but instead was intended “to substitute for common law remedies a
more ‘simple, expeditious and comprehensive mode of ascertaining damages' recoverable at
common law.”156 As a result, common law claims against dam owners are not available
unless the dam owner is subject to and violates an order under the Mill Act.157 Owners of
dams covered by the Act must compensate for flooding caused by the impoundment of
water behind the dam, independent of fault. Specifically, “[t]he owner or occupant of land
which has been overflowed or otherwise injured by such dam may bring a civil action to
obtain compensation therefor.”158 A jury determines the amount of damages caused by the
water, which may be payable annually or in gross, and sets the maximum height of the
dam.159 The Act applies to dams that “raise water for working of” a water mill160 and to lands
flowed for a “domestic reservoir corporation,”161 but it does not apply to existing dams
unless they are raised or otherwise materially change.162 The Massachusetts Mill Act thus
provides limited liability coverage to certain dams and types of flooding (i.e., upstream
flooding).
Massachusetts law contains a second, more general statement that dam owners are liable for
flooding caused by a dam. Specifically, a dam owner “shall be responsible and liable for
damage to property of others or injury to persons, including but not limited to, loss of life

CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-446 – 52-445.
Id. § 52-447.
155 MASS. GEN. L AWS ch. 253, §§ 1 et seq.
156 Lombardi v. Bailey, 147 N.E.2d 169, 174 (Mass. 1958) (quoting Duncan v. New England Power Co., 145 N.E. 427,
428 (Mass. 1924)).
157 Leonard v. Wading River Reservoir Co., 113 Mass. 235, 236 (Mass. 1873) (“if a mill-owner builds or maintains his
dam contrary to the conditions and restrictions imposed by the jury under proceedings duly had according to the
statutes, he loses the immunity from suits at law provided by the statute, and is liable to an action for damages as a
wrong-doer.”); Brady v. Blackinton, 55 N.E. 474, 475 (Mass. 1899).
158 MASS. GEN. L AWS. Ch. 253, § 4.
159 Id. §§ 3, 7-9.
160 Id. § 1 (“A person may, as hereinafter provided, erect and maintain a water mill and a dam to raise water for working
it”). Subsequent sections of the Act refer to “such dams.”
161 Id. § 42.
162 Id. § 20.
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resulting from the operation, failure or misoperation of a dam.”163 The judiciary has
jurisdiction to enforce this section.164 However, this section does not explicitly create a
private right of action, so private plaintiffs are unlikely to be able to use it.
•

New Hampshire’s extensive dam statutes establish the duty of owners to maintain dams, and
breach of that duty may result in negligence liability. Dam owners “shall maintain and repair
the dam so that it shall not become a dam in disrepair.”165 A “dam in disrepair” is defined as
a dam that “is a menace to public safety and is incapable of safely impounding flood waters
to its crest, or is incapable of maintaining a reasonably constant level of waters impounded,
or is one which does not contain adequate gates and sluiceways to provide for the holding or
controlled discharge of waters impounded.”166 The state Supreme Court has established that
the statutory requirement to maintain dams “provides a standard of conduct on the part of
dam owners intended to protect against damage from the flooding of the land of others by
their dams.”167 Violation of the statutory duty to maintain dams is an element of a negligence
claim.
New Hampshire statutes contain a second potential grounds for statutory damages against
dam owners that is analogous to the Rhode Island Mill Dam Act. It provides:
If the land of any person shall be overflowed, drained or otherwise injured by
the use of any dam or addition to such dam and the damage shall not, within
30 days after due notice of such damage, be satisfactorily adjusted by the party
erecting or maintaining the dam or increase in such dam, either party may
apply by petition to the superior court in the county or counties where such
damage arises to have said damage that has been or may be done assessed.168
While this language suggests a right of action to recover any damages resulting from floods
arising from dam operations, the state courts have rejected this interpretation. “This
statutory proceeding provides for the assessment of damages when the mill owner exercises
the flowage right given by the mill act. It is not intended to be for the recovery of damages
for an act of wrongful flowage. In such a case there was a common law right of action for
damages. Plaintiffs [sic] petitions seek to recover damages resulting from a tortious flooding
of their land and do not come within the purpose of” this section.169 Based on this holding,
this provision does not impose liability for flooding associated with severe storm events.
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MASS. GEN. LAWS. Ch. 253, § 48B; 302 MASS. CODE REGS. § 10.13 (repeating language).
MASS. GEN. LAWS. Ch. 253, § 50.
165 N.H. REV. STAT. § 482:11-a.
166 Id. § 482:2(V).
167 Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 289 A.2d 68, 70-71 (N.H. 1972).
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•

New Jersey has not enacted a statute that expressly determines liability for dam owners.

•

New York statutes establish a duty to maintain dams in a safe manner, but the statutes do
not establish private liability. “[I]n response to several dam failures that caused significant
flooding in New York during the 1990s,”170 the New York Legislature amended the state
Environmental Conservation Law to require that “[a]ny owner of a dam or other structure
which impounds waters shall at all times operate and maintain said structure and all
appurtenant structures in a safe condition.”171 Violation of this duty may result in
administrative penalties, but it cannot be used to support lawsuits by private claimants
because it does not create a private right of action.172 As a result, claims for damages by
individuals must be evaluated under the common law.

This analysis suggests that Rhode Island law is consistent with flowage acts in other northeast states
in limiting liability under these provisions. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York have
analogous liability provisions in their flowage acts, but only Massachusetts provides a cause of action
for lawsuits by property owners injured by dam operations. Even in Massachusetts, the scope of the
Mill Act is limited to certain types of dams and applies primarily to flooding caused by erection of a
new dam rather than flooding caused by excessive water levels. The other states lack a private cause
of action (New York) or only allow damages at the time of initial construction (New Hampshire).
Based on the exclusion or substantial limitations on liability associated with “flowage acts” in
northeast states, limits on the use of the Rhode Island Mill Dam Act to recover flood damage due to
failure or severe storms appear consistent with regional trends.

4.2 Strict Liability and Negligence
Commentators have noted that states have not uniformly adopted strict liability for dam failure or
flood damages.173 While most states have adopted some forms of strict liability, the application of
this theory to dam owners has been mixed. Where strict liability is not used, courts apply negligence
standards instead. This section reviews the use of strict liability and negligence in northeast states
before comparing regional trends with Rhode Island law.
•

The few dam liability cases decided in Connecticut have been uniformly based on negligence
rather than strict liability. For example, in Beauton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., the
Connecticut Supreme Court considered a case brought by plaintiffs who claimed that
negligent construction and operation of a dam caused their cottages to be swept away and
destroyed after a “freshet” destroyed flashboards.174 The court agreed that negligence was

Hosmer v. Kubricky Constr. Corp., 931 N.Y.S.2d 738 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-0507.
172 Alaimo v. Town of Fort Ann, 883 N.Y.S.2d 321, 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (“A dam owner who violates ECL 150507(1) may be penalized, but only the Attorney General is specifically authorized to bring an action to recover those
penalties.”) (citing Nowak v. Madura, 757 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Mem.) (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)).
173 See THOMAS, supra note 71, at 6-9; Binder, supra note 65, at 23.
174 3 A.2d 315, 316 (Conn. 1938).
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appropriate, stating that “[t]he defendant in this case was not an insurer; the measure of its
duty in the construction and operation of its dam was to use reasonable care.”175 State courts
have similarly applied negligence standards in other cases.176 Connecticut courts have
accepted strict liability in limited contexts, such as blasting and piledriving,177 but have not
considered a strict liability claim to date arising from dam failure or other dam-related flood
events. As the relevant dam failure cases are dated, it is possible that a case arising from a
future dam failure or flood event could alter whether and how strict liability may apply in
Connecticut.
•

Massachusetts courts have explicitly adopted strict liability and applied it to dam failure. In
Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., the plaintiff brought an action to recover for damage
caused when water stored behind a dam on the defendant’s property was released and
flowed onto the plaintiff’s property.178 Based on a lengthy discussion of the history of strict
liability in Massachusetts, including for dams, the court held that strict liability has long
existed in Massachusetts and can apply to dam failures.179 It explained that the six factors set
out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts must be applied to the facts and circumstances of
each case to determine whether strict liability applies.180 Where these factors do not support
strict liability, plaintiffs may seek compensation under a negligence claim.181 Thus,
Massachusetts adopts the strict liability standard set out in the Restatement, providing a
strong basis for plaintiffs to seek compensation for damages resulting from dam losses.

•

New Hampshire courts have clearly rejected strict liability for dam failures.182 While the state
has accepted strict liability in some circumstances, such as products liability, the court in
Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co. held that the considerations that led the court to adopt strict
liability in product liability actions are “substantially different from those which prevail in the
case of dams.”183 As a result, it declined to extend strict liability to dam cases. To recover,
plaintiffs must instead bring claims under a negligence theory and establish each required

Id. at 319 (Conn. 1938).
Wargo v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 18 A.2d 924, 926 (Conn. 1941); City of Bridgeport v. Bridgeport Hydraulic
Co., 70 A. 650 (Conn. 1908); Krupa v. Farmington River Power Co., 157 A.2d 914 (Conn. 1959).
177 See, e.g., Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott & Watrous Engineering Co., 79 A.2d 591, 595 (Conn. 1951) (pile-driving);
Green v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 595 A.2d 1383 (Conn. App. 1991) (explosives).
178
323 N.E.2d 876, 877 (Mass. 1975).
179
Id. at 878-886 (citing Bratton v. Rudnick, 186 N.E. 669 (Mass. 1933); Golden v. Amory, 109 N.E.2d 131 (Mass.
1952)).
180
Id. at 887-888 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §§ 519-20).
181 Id. at 883 (“The plaintiff must decide whether it is more economic and feasible to establish negligence under
appropriate pleadings, or to prove that the activity in question comes within the parameters of strict liability.”).
182 Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 289 A.2d 68 (N.H. 1972).
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element, including that owners failed to meet their duty to maintain dams so that they are
not “dams in disrepair.”184
•

New Jersey courts adopted strict liability as a concept in State v. Ventron Corp.,185 where the
state Supreme Court held a landowner strictly liable for harm caused by toxic wastes escaped
from his property and flowed onto that of his neighbors.186 In its reasoning, the court stated,
“an ultrahazardous activity which introduces an unusual danger into the community…should
pay its own way in the event it actually causes damage to others.”187 The court adopted the
six-factor test described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts to determine whether an
activity is ultrahazardous.188 Thus, as in other states that have adopted this test, a plaintiff
could prevail on a strict liability claim in a dam flooding case if she can prove that the dam
operations are ultrahazardous; if not, the plaintiff would need to show negligence to recover
damages, as considered in a variety of past dam flooding cases.189

•

New York law has adopted strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, which may
apply to dams. In 1873, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the strict liability doctrine
in Losee v. Buchanan.190 However, modern courts have accepted strict liability in the state for
abnormally dangerous activities, applying the factors in the Restatement (Second) of Torts to
determine whether the doctrine applies to particular factual circumstances.191 In Doundoulakis
v. Town of Hempstead, the state’s highest court noted with approval analysis suggesting these
factors may be met as a result of water impoundment resulting in groundwater seepage.192 As
a result, it is reasonable to expect that courts may apply strict liability to cases involving dam
failure. Damages cases that do not meet the standards for strict liability, on the other hand,
will be evaluated under negligence. For example, upstream owners of property on a dam that
failed recently were held to have successfully stated a negligence claim for loss of waterfront
property.193 In such cases, plaintiffs must show that the dam owner has breached its duty to
maintain the dam and damages will be limited to property and personal injury, exclusive of
economic losses.194 Common law tort remedies in New York thus include strict liability

See Town of Monroe v. Connecticut River Lumber Co., 39 A. 1019, 1021 (N.H. 1894) (“[I]t was a duty cast upon the
defendants by the law to so use and maintain the dam as not unnecessarily to endanger the safety or property of others;
and, if they neglected this duty, the law renders them liable for the consequences.”).
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94 N.J. 473 (N.J. 1983).
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Id. at 488.
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Id. at 478.
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Id. at 491 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977)).
189 See, e.g., Tower Marine, Inc. v. City of New Brunswick, 420 A.2d 1029 (N.J. Super. 1980); Kidde Mfg. Co. v. Town of
Bloomfield, 118 A.2d 535 (N.J. 1955).
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193 Alaimo v. Town of Fort Ann, 883 N.Y.S.2d 321, 3223-24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
194
532 Madison Gourmet Foods v. Finlandia Ctr. 96 N.Y.2d 280, 290-292 (N.Y. 2001).
184

27

against all dam owners where warranted by the facts of a case, and negligence claims in other
circumstances.
Northeast states apply negligence and strict liability to dam failures and flooding similarly in most
instances, although there are some differences. Negligence is accepted in all of the states, but
plaintiffs may face higher standards to recover in some jurisdictions. New Hampshire and New
York negligence law is notable because these states have established statutory duties of care
applicable to dam owners. Thus, owners in these states must maintain dams in a safe condition as a
matter of law, such that dam failure effectively indicates a breach of this duty. For example, New
Hampshire law provides that a dam that cannot safely impound flood waters or that has inadequate
spillways is a “dam in disrepair” and therefore indicates a breach of the owner’s duty. The owner of
a dam that must release flood waters for safety reasons—or which lacks sufficient spillway capacity
to deal with more severe storms caused by climate change—thus appears to have breached its duty
to maintain the dam. A dam failure or of intentional releases to reduce pressure on a dam thus
would suggest that the owner has breached its statutory duty, thereby satisfying the first two
elements of a negligence claim. This breach is likely to apply even if the structure was designed to
handle a predicted maximum flow that was appropriate when it was built: courts have held owners
responsible for adjusting to changing patterns of water flow whether caused by changing climate or
changing land use patterns.195
Rhode Island lacks a statutory standard of care applicable to dam owners. As a result, failure to
adapt dams to changes in predicted maximum flows may not trigger negligence liability. On the
other hand, state dam inspection requirements may provide a proxy for a statutory duty of care. In
other words, a dam owner is likely to be negligent if it has not remedied safety issues identified by
OCI. Thus, while a statutory duty to maintain safe dams could clarify the scope of dam owner duties
in Rhode Island negligence cases, courts are likely to consider results of existing regulatory processes
when deciding whether dam owners have been negligent.
Implementation of strict liability in the northeast states is relatively consistent. While New
Hampshire does not recognize strict liability, the other states—including Rhode Island—have
adopted the six-factor test set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts for at least some
ultrahazardous activities. Thus, dam-related plaintiffs in these states may validly claim damages
under a strict liability theory. To recover, however, they must show that the dam was ultrahazardous
through evidence about its particular context. Courts have applied the doctrine to dam-related
flooding in two states—Massachusetts and New York—leaving the others (including Rhode Island)
without specific authority to draw upon. Nonetheless, given the use of dams as an example of an
ultrahazardous activity in the Restatement, it is likely that courts will accept the validity of the strict
Board of Ed. of Borough of Manasquan v. State Dep’t Transp., 351 A.2d 17, 20 (N.J. 1976) (discussing with approval
Riddle v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 73 S.E.2d 793, 800 (W. Va. 1952) (“[A] railroad which constructs a culvert in its
roadbed must provide for such floods as may reasonably be anticipated in view of the local climate and history, and
although the railroad may have used reasonable care in the original construction of the culvert, if subsequent
developments prove that it is insufficient it becomes the duty of the railroad to improve the culvert to meet the changed
condition.”).
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liability doctrine in some dam cases—perhaps significant- and/or high-risk dams—if and when
called upon to do so.

4.3 Liability for Drawdown
Drawdowns prior to significant storm events may reduce the risk of dam failure and/or avoid the
need for intentional releases. However, dam owners may face legal limits on drawdowns, including
injunctions and damages. This section discusses the limits on drawdowns in each coastal northeast
state as a baseline for comparison with Rhode Island law, which was discussed in full in section 3.3.
These limits include both statutory and common law restrictions on drawdowns.
•

The Connecticut Supreme Court has required a dam owner to maintain the level of a dam
and prohibited the destruction of the dam where the owner’s predecessor had covenanted
with the neighboring owners to do so.196 However, “riparian owners may prevent only the
unreasonable lowering of the lake by a dam owner.”197 Reasonableness is determined by
specifics of particular cases, such as who owns the land under the pond, whether the dam is
on a navigable stream, the nature of the right claimed by the plaintiff (e.g., recreation,
fishing), and whether that party or abutting property owners have property rights protecting
their rights to use the pond.198 Courts have upheld lake level reductions for flood control,199
and courts are unlikely to deem lake level reductions unreasonable if they are intended to
protect public safety.

•

Dam drawdowns in Massachusetts are restricted by the state Wetlands Act. In
Massachusetts, this act requires owners to notify and obtain approval from the municipal
conservation commission prior to undertaking any action that may alter a wetland, including
the banks of a pond.200 This requirement applies to dam impoundments, and lowering water
levels is an “alteration” that triggers the approval requirements.201 The Wetlands Act does
provide exemptions, however, including for emergencies and for an “existing and lawfully
located structure or facility” used to provide water, electric, or other utility services to the
public.202 As a result, public water reservoirs are not required to notify the conservation
commission prior to reducing water levels for flood control, but other dam owners must
obtain prior approval before changing water levels.

Labbadia v. Bailey, 205 A.2d 377 (Conn. 1964).
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198 Ace Equipment Sales, Inc. v. Buccino, 869 A.2d 626 (Conn. 2005).
199 Id.
200 MASS. GEN. L AWS ch. 131 § 40; Central Water Dist. Assoc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 81 (Mass. Super.
Ct. 1994).
201 Central Water Dist. Assoc., 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 81.
202 Id.; MASS. GEN. L AWS ch. 131 § 40.
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•

New Hampshire law allows dam owners to draw down the levels of their impoundments.
Dam owners have not been required to maintain water levels in New Hampshire courts.203
Moreover, New Hampshire has a unique statutory process whereby lake levels may be
altered for emergency purposes. The Department of Environmental Services, which
regulates dams, is authorized to investigate and control high and low levels, including by
ascertaining “the extent to which owners and managers of dams take into consideration
variations of runoff and plan for and anticipate emergencies.”204 It is directed to seek dam
owners’ cooperation in regulating flow to “minimize damage to public and private property
at times of high water” and can “direct” dam owners to hold or release water when “an
emergency exists or is threatened.”205 Thus, New Hampshire has established clear legal
authority to manipulate impoundment levels to reduce potential flood events in anticipation
of storm events.

•

New Jersey law provides a statutory limitation on reduction of reservoir levels in certain
circumstances. Abutting landowners, the local government, or municipal residents can file a
petition with the state to protect and require the maintenance of any dam that has existed for
more than 20 years, has developed shorelines, or “has become a valuable resource for the
quality of life.”206 Once filed, the dam owner must obtain approval from the commissioner
before lowering water levels “below the usual low-water mark.”207 In such cases, abutters
may be required to contribute to dam maintenance under the state Safe Dams Act. Thus,
New Jersey dam owners may be limited in their ability to change water levels due to
opposition from riparians, but these limits do not mandate maintenance at the high-water
line.

•

The ability of dam owners to change the level of impoundments in New York depends on
the ownership of the impounded waters. Courts have declined to require dam owners to
maintain lake levels at a particular height in the absence of an express agreement to do so.208

New Hampshire dam owners have not been held subject to limits on drawdowns in suits brought by abutters. See
Fish v. Homestead Woolen Mills, 592 A.2d 1151, 1153 (N.H. 1991) (“[W]e decline to extend the defendants' duty of due
care in maintaining their dam to include protection against injuries which arguably resulted from the lake's lower water
level, which was still above the natural low-water mark. Were we to do otherwise, we would be imposing upon dam
owners a duty to maintain a specific “safe” water level in their respective lakes. This would not only place an
unreasonable burden on dam owners to determine and maintain a level of water that offers minimum risk to all possible
users but would also be contrary to the long-established rights of dam owners.”); Whitcher v. State, 181 A. 549, 556
(N.H. 1935) (“[T]he plaintiff's right is to use as much water, at least down to the natural low-water mark, as is necessary
for use at his privilege, provided he makes no intentional misuse and causes no unnecessary annoyance and damage to
the defendants.”).
204 N.H. REV. STAT. § 482:4.
205 Id.
206 N.J. STAT. § 58:4-9.
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664 N.Y.S.2d 662 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (“The fact that plaintiff may have lake privileges, a right not specifically
provided in his deed, does not give him the right to enforce [a] covenant [regarding dam maintenance and lake level].”);
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However, control of the level of state-owned lakes is a “sovereign power of the State” that
can be exercised only by the legislature.209 The case establishing this precedent considered
Lake George, a large lake, and the legislature has duly exercised its role to require dam
owners to maintain the lake level within explicit average levels.210 This mandate, however,
contains a specific exception for “emergencies,” which would allow dam owners to reduce
levels based on expected storm events.
Other navigable lakes lack a specific level set by legislation, but must maintain levels within
limits. Courts have noted that “if the lake is navigable then it is presumptively under the
ownership of New York State, on behalf of the public, at the low water mark.”211
Navigability, in turn, is a factual determination that includes recreational use.212 Under these
precedents, dam owners may lack legal authority to independently change the level of
impoundments large enough to be navigable, but on other impoundments their ability to
lower lake levels is limited only by contractual obligations or property rights held by abutting
owners. These limits may be, but are not required to be, included in dam construction
permits issued by the Water Resources Commission.213 In addition, storage reservoirs
operated for river regulations are required to maintain levels between low- and high-flow
levels, except that high levels may be exceeded in “floods or other emergencies.”214
Northeast states have adopted a range of approaches to dam drawdowns. Massachusetts, like Rhode
Island, requires approval from environmental regulators prior to changing water levels. Unlike
Rhode Island, Massachusetts has an emergency exception to its Wetland Act authority, as well as an
exception for utility and drinking water reservoirs. By contrast, Rhode Island dam exceptions are
tied to dam hazard characteristics and provide more limited exceptions for emergency repairs. As a
result, preemptive and seasonal drawdowns require RIDEM approval in Rhode Island, but may be
authorized without approval in Massachusetts.
Consistent with Rhode Island law, states other than New Jersey rejected claims to particular water
levels by upstream riparian owners absent an agreement by the dam owner. New Jersey is the
exception, having established a statutory process for water level claims—which requires abutting
beneficiaries to contribute to dam maintenance.
Unlike Rhode Island, New Hampshire and New York provide state authority to set water level limits
in dam impoundments. All states that have recognized limitations on dam drawdowns, however,
recognize exceptions, including reasonableness, utility drawdowns, and flood and emergency
People v. System Props., Inc., 141 N.E.2d 429, 435 (N.Y. 1957) (“Exercise of [sovereign] rights includes control of
the river and, as against this sovereign right and responsibility, the dam operator could never acquire any such
prescriptive rights as would interfere therewith.”).
210 N.Y. NAV. LAW § 38.
211 Rogers v. South Slope Holding Corp., 656 N.Y.S.2d 169, 172 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
212 Id.
213 Allen v. N.Y. Water Res. Comm’n, 299 N.Y.S. 586 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (upholding permit that did not establish lake
level).
214 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 15-2133.
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drawdowns. These exceptions are likely to apply to any dam drawdowns prior to a storm event that
are intended to reduce subsequent flood risks. Rhode Island could consider setting similar
exceptions should it establish dam level authority in the future.

Conclusion
Dam owner liability in Rhode Island is a complex and uncertain issue that is highly dependent on
the facts of each particular case. Rhode Island dam owners face potential liabilities under statutory,
common law, and constitutional law, each of which is affected by factors such as the type of
flooding, the role and actions of the parties involved, the type and use of the dam, and the
management decisions employed. In most instances, Rhode Island law is consistent with regional
trends. However, Rhode Island case law is limited, such that some issues remain uncertain. For
example, the application of the Mill Dam Act liability provisions and authorization for drawdowns
have not been resolved. Dam owners facing uncertain liability may benefit from the use of proper
dam management practices to reduce the risk of failures and associated injury until their legal
obligations are clarified as a result of statutory action or additional court decisions.
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